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§9.01 Introduction 
  
Data, or information, is often referred to as ‘the oil’ of the digital era.1 Despite the fact that 
this comparison is not very original, it is apt, since data has now become an essential asset for 
conducting business. Indeed, the data economy is reliant on the commercialisation of data. 
For example, data is essential for the digitisation of production (smart factories), for digitised 
products such as smart cars and smart wearables that can communicate with one another and 
the environment through the Industrial Internet and the Internet of Things, and for the 
development and use of smart systems like artificial intelligence (AI) programs. As such, it 
comes as no surprise that, in recent years, discussions about the regulation of data have 
increasingly caught the attention of academics, policy makers, and industry representatives. 
In the European Union (EU), the issue of regulating information has been considered by the 
Commission on many occasions, and has recently been on the political agenda as part of the 
Digital Single Market Policy.2 The question is what kind of regulation is needed in order to 
make the data economy work. 
Data can, with several caveats, largely be divided into the categories of personal and 
non-personal. This article focuses on the latter category. While the business models used by 
the major internet platforms of Web 2.0 and 3.0 were built mainly upon the use of personal 
data, soon the data economy will instead rely largely on non-personal (or industrial) data.3 
Non-personal data will be necessary not only for consumers to enjoy the benefits of the data 
economy, but also for many industries, as well as public authorities. In order for the complex 
framework of the data economy to function, it is essential to find a proper balance between 
controlling data and providing access to it.  
Notwithstanding the importance of non-personal data to the data-driven economy, to 
date, the most important issues around its regulation (including issues relating to both control 
and access) remain either partially or completely unaddressed. Notably, issues of protecting 
(ownership), accessing (access) and processing (trade) data have been identified as the major 
challenges that could create barriers to the free flow of data, thus potentially hampering the 
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creation of a digital single market in the EU. However, while the Commission has clearly 
recognised the free flow of data as a prerequisite for an efficient data economy, there is as yet 
no coherent plan as to how this goal should be reached. 
The principle of the free flow of data is closely connected to freedom of speech. For 
instance, Article 11 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights explicitly mentions the 
freedom ‘to receive and impart information’.4 As the data economy has grown, several 
frameworks for fostering access to data have been presented in the scholarly literature.5 In 
concrete terms, the EU has thus far only introduced a Regulation on the free flow of non-
personal data in the European Union, which regulates some data storage and/or processing 
services and activities.6 
This article contextualises the debate on the regulation of non-personal data in the 
context of data ownership via exclusive rights like intellectual property rights (IPR, IP). The 
paper focuses on the IPR regimes that are the most relevant to the protection of data, namely 
copyright, database rights, and soft IPRs such as trade secrets. Specifically, it aims at: 1) 
understanding whether the current IPR regime in the EU is applicable to the protection of 
data, 2) considering whether the current legal framework (including the recently proposed 
new legislation) fosters innovation in the data economy by striking an appropriate balance 
between controlling and providing access to data and, ultimately, 3) exploring more workable 
alternatives to current legislation. It concludes with a critique of the consequences of 
extending exclusive rights to data per se, as well as of the frequent tendency of the EU 
legislator to adopt related rights that are fragmentary and narrow in scope, without fully 
recognising their impact on the European copyright and IPR system as a whole. We argue 
that a better approach would be to strengthen the principle of the free flow of data (for 
instance, by embedding it as a core freedom in the EU internal market), thereby preventing 
the creation of any national measures hampering the free flow of data across the EU. 
 
§9.02 What do we Mean by Data? 
 
The starting point of this discussion relates to what is to be understood by the terms ‘data’ 
and ‘information’. While there is a good explanation of the meaning of the term ‘personal 
data’ in EU law, there are no definitions of the terms ‘non-personal data’ or ‘industrial data’, 
nor of ‘data’ per se. According to the GDPR, personal data is information that refers to an 
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identified or identifiable person.7 Non-personal data could, therefore, be defined in opposing 
terms as data that does not refer to an identified or identifiable person. 
Industrial (big) data often refers to a large amount of diversified time series data 
generated at a high speed by industrial equipment.8 Due to the fact that industrial data is 
generated by automated equipment and processes in a controlled environment where human 
involvement is kept to a minimum, it is usually more structured, more highly correlated, and 
more orderly than non-industrial data.  
Even though there is no consensus on the meaning of the term ‘data’ per se, from a 
legal perspective it is possible to identify some basic elements on which there is agreement. 
In legal writings, an oft-cited point of reference for defining data is the wide-reaching 
definition developed by the joint technical committee of the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), according to 
which data is the ‘[r]einterpretable representation of information in a formalized manner 
suitable for communication, interpretation, or processing.’9 While ‘data’ is usually seen as 
raw material, ‘information’ is understood to include an understanding of the significance of 
data; data is objective, while information is not.10 Information theory defines information as 
‘the number of discernible signals or data points needed to transmit a message’.11  
Several authors draw a distinction between data, syntax, and semantic content, 
whereby information is the semantic content that can be extracted from data or signals.12 It 
has also been argued that the extraction of semantic content from a signal, a message, or a 
data set requires a combination of prior structural knowledge (i.e. an understanding of the 
semantics and syntax of the discrete symbols or the continuous signal) and contextual 
knowledge, acquired through learning.13 For example, if a person has knowledge of the 
Finnish alphabet, he can read the words of a Finnish text, but without prior knowledge of 
Finnish syntax and vocabulary, he cannot understand the meaning of the text. 
The distinction between data and semantic content is also important for distinguishing 
media products such as books, music, films, and news articles from the underlying data that 
encode this content. It is uncontroversial that media content is protected by IPRs, but what 
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about the data per se? In addition, if the law were to recognise the ownership of data through 
IPRs, it would be important to define where such rights would apply: would ownership relate 
to digital data sets themselves, in the form of bits and bytes, for instance, or to the 
information such data sets contain? Distinguishing between the two might not be an easy 
task. 
Another important point to highlight when discussing IPR protection for data relates 
to whether the data is created by legal or natural persons, or generated by machines or 
sensors. Some of the literature on this subject makes a distinction between machine-generated 
and human-generated data.14 The concept of machine-generated data is also often used to 
help distinguish between personal and non-personal data because most of the machine-
generated data is non-personal. The distinction between direct and indirect human data 
sources, however, is not clear-cut, especially because much machine-generated data requires 
a direct or indirect human source. Indeed, the issue of the human or non-human creation of 
data is a sensitive one when discussing the possibility of applying IPRs to data, since IPR 
entitlement is based on the idea of human creators and inventors and the IP system is 
supposed to incentivise (human) creativity and innovation.15 Machine-generated data 
challenges some of the basic principles of IP: firstly, the creation and use of such data takes 
place on a much larger scale, and in different forms, compared to traditional IP-protected 
works; secondly, the authorship and inventorship of such data is dispersed (e.g. between the 
owner of a sensor/machine, the machine’s programmers, the person collecting the data, etc.), 
while the need to provide incentives for data creation is questionable.16 Any discussion of 
protecting data by providing incentives through IPRs should take these points into 
consideration. 
 
§9.03 The Challenge of Protecting Industrial Data Through Exclusive Rights  
 
Probably the most challenging aspect of applying traditional concepts of property ownership 
to data is that data is a non-rival good, that is, multiple people can use the same data at the 
same time without any loss of information for any of the parties involved.  
The IP system was established to deal with the non-rivalrous nature of intangible 
assets. A non-rivalrous good (e.g. data) is one that multiple people can use simultaneously 
without impeding the use of the same good by others. In the context of IPR, ownership refers 
to the negative right to exclude others from performing certain acts, instead of the traditional 
concept of ownership as a set of rights over property.17 While the ownership of data as IP was 
not a concern in the analogue information age due to the fact that analogue datasets are 
usually costly to copy and reuse, the dramatic reduction in the cost of copying, merging, and 
transmitting digital content has made it significantly harder to create barriers that make the 
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use, reproduction, and transmission of information excludable.18 However, ownership in the 
IPR sense of the term might not be applicable to the creation and management of data, in 
which the concept of ownership tends to be used to assign responsibility and accountability.19 
As a consequence, even though there is a well-established legal framework for applying 
exclusive IPRs to the intangible and non-rival expression or implementation of ideas (e.g. 
through the copyright and patent systems), the legal status of data as regards IP ownership is 
less clear. Although there is no legislation on the ownership of data in the EU or its Member 
States, there are numerous pieces of legislation that have an impact on data control and 
access. In particular, ownership rights in non-personal data are partly regulated by the 
copyright law system and the sui generis database right,20 combined with some provisions in 
the trade secrets regime and in general contract law. 
 
[A] Data and Copyright 
 
In terms of protectable subject matter, it seems reasonable to assume that copyright law is, to 
some extent, applicable to data. However, even though it is clear that things like the texts, 
sounds, and videos included within data sets are copyrightable, whether the data per se can 
receive copyright protection is highly questionable. On a general level, it has been argued that 
the UsedSoft decision of 201221 could have opened the door for a discussion of the ownership 
of intangible assets, such as data.22 In fact, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) held that the commercial distribution of software via internet downloads is based not 
only on licensing, but also on the sale of goods. Therefore, following the principle of 
exhaustion, the owner of copyright in a piece of software cannot prevent a perpetual licensee 
from reselling his software (understood as a downloadable file). In other words, the CJEU’s 
decision implies that there is a specific ownership right in intangible goods like software 
downloaded via the internet.  
From the perspective of the legal principles of copyright law, two key issues need to 
be addressed: firstly, the conditions under which data can be considered a ‘work’ for 
copyright purposes are unclear; secondly, there is a major question over how to draw the line 
between copyrightable, original data and uncopyrightable, unoriginal data. 
The Berne Convention states that a work is protected by copyright if it is a literary or 
artistic work. This qualification is quite broad and may cover virtually any creative piece of 
work. A piece of work may be protected regardless of its form or mode of expression, 
provided that it is original. Works excluded from protection include ideas and principles, 
facts and information, mathematical theories and algorithms, official decisions, and works 
that are no longer protected and have fallen into the public domain. Even though 
copyrightable works include categories like literary works, musical works, dramatic works, 
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available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2413974 (accessed 30th April 2019). 
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etc, such categories should be viewed broadly. Depending on its nature, data could fall into 
several of these categories. Traditionally, the concept of a ‘work’ in copyright law has been 
considered alongside the originality requirement rather than being addressed separately. 
However, recent trends have highlighted the importance of creating a clear and independent 
definition of what is to be considered a ‘work’. For instance, the Levola v. Smilde Foods 
case,23 currently under consideration by the CJEU, raises the possibility of creations that 
cannot be perceived by sight and/or hearing qualifying as ‘works’. It seems reasonable to 
suppose that while deciding on this specific case, the CJEU might also shed light on the 
question of how a ‘work’ should be characterised in general in order to attract copyright 
protection. This might provide some clarity on the issue of data as a work. 
The originality requirement in European copyright law is defined in the Computer 
Programmes Directive,24 the Database Directive,25 and the Term Directive26 as the stipulation 
that a work be its ‘author’s own intellectual creation’. Up until the Infopaq decision of 
2009,27 however, this requirement applied only to specific categories of works, namely 
photographs, computer programs, and databases. The Infopaq decision extended this 
interpretation of originality to all other categories of work. Based on the argument that the 
Information Society Directive (InfoSoc Directive) should be rooted in similar principles to 
those of other Directives, the CJEU held that copyright protection in the sense of Article 2(a) 
of the InfoSoc Directive should apply only to subject matter that is original in the sense that it 
is its author’s own intellectual creation. The CJEU explained this interpretation further in 
other key decisions, such as Murphy,28 Painer,29 and Football Dataco,30 stating that for a 
work to be considered its ‘author’s own intellectual creation’, the author must ‘stamp his 
personal touch or reflect his personality in the sense that he expresses his creative abilities in 
original manner by making free and creative choices (emphasis added)’. It might be difficult 
for data per se to attract copyright protection, both because data often lacks this level of 
creativity and because, as previously mentioned, most datasets nowadays are generated by 
machines rather than by creative humans. This second point especially raises the question of 
whether the requirement that a work be its ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ (where an 
‘author’ has traditionally been understood to mean a natural person)31 can even be met by 
data. Moreover, even in cases where the production of machine-generated data can be linked 
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to a legitimate author, it might be very difficult to identify the person by whom the 
arrangements necessary for the creation of the work were undertaken. For instance, the 
authorship of the work and the ownership of the copyright could be dispersed amongst, inter 
alia: 1) the designer(s) of the smart system, 2) the data provider(s), and 3) the system’s 
user(s). Ultimately, the most challenging aspect of determining whether a given set of 
machine-generated data is eligible for copyright protection is the assessment of whether the 
human contribution to the development of the data is sufficient to demonstrate the existence 
of a human’s own intellectual creation or contribution to an inventive concept.32  
 
[B] The Database Right Dimension 
 
The EU legal regime for database protection33 is a two-tier system: copyright protection is 
granted to creative, original databases, while sui generis protection is granted to databases 
that are the result of ‘substantial investment’.34  
Copyright protection applies to databases the structure of which is original, that is to 
say where the selection or the arrangement of the contents of the database is its ‘author's own 
intellectual creation’.35 This criterion does not apply to the data within the database; 
originality is needed in the structure of the database itself. 
Sui generis database protection provides a better basis for protecting datasets in the 
data economy. However, this form of protection also has limitations, both in terms of the 
subject-matter and the scope of protection. Firstly, the sui generis database right only protects 
a database as a collection of data and not individual items of data per se. In fact, the DB 
Directive forbids the ‘extraction’ and ‘re-utilisation’ of individual data included within a 
database only if these acts constitute a ‘permanent or temporary transfer of all or a substantial 
part of the contents of a database to another medium’.36  
Secondly, while the DB Directive includes a general aim of protecting investments,37 
this protection extends only to certain traditional types of digital database that are easily 
accessible and organised around a fixed base, for instance collections of articles, photos, or 
job advertisements; collections of information in booking systems for hotels or airline tickets; 
or search engines. In these databases, the collection or arrangement of the data is valuable. 
However, protection does not extend to non-traditional digital databases the value of which 
lies in large volumes of data in itself. The main reason why it might be difficult to protect 
non-personal data through the sui generis database right stems from the Directive’s definition 
of a database, further developed by the CJEU. A database is defined as a ‘collection of 
independent works, data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and 
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individually accessible by electronic or other means’.38 The CJEU has stated that the term 
‘independent works’ refers to the fact that a database consists of ‘any collection of works, 
data or other materials, separable from one another without the value of their contents being 
affected’.39 A database must also include a ‘method or system of some sort for the retrieval of 
each of its constituent materials’.40 A ‘systematic or methodical’ way of arrangement and 
individual accessibility, regardless of whether the systematic or methodical arrangement is 
physically apparent or not, means that the collection must be contained within a fixed base. It 
must also include technical means, such as electronic, electromagnetic, or electro-optical 
processes, or other means, such as an index, table of contents, or particular plan or method of 
classification, to allow for the retrieval of any independent materials contained within it.41 
Although it is possible that the data collected and utilized by smart systems could create 
databases that fall under the scope of protection of the DB Directive, as such datasets might 
be valuable when separated from the systems that created them, it seems unlikely that these 
datasets would fulfil the requirements of systematic or methodical arrangement and 
individual accessibility required by the Directive, since smart systems usually capture, 
analyse, and utilize data immediately, without using any fixed base. 
Thirdly, Article 7(1) of the DB Directive states that sui generis protection is reserved 
for databases for which there has been ‘qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial 
investment’ in the ‘obtaining, verification or presentation’ of their contents.42 The CJEU 
stated in the British Horseracing Board case43 that the notion of ‘investment’ refers to the 
resources used to monitor the accuracy of the materials collected when a database is created 
and during its operation, with a view to ensuring the reliability of the information contained 
within it. Resources used for verification during the creation of data or other materials that 
are subsequently collected in a database, on the other hand, count as resources used in 
creating materials and cannot be taken into account when assessing whether there was 
substantial investment in the database under the terms of Article 7(1) of the DB Directive. 
The CJEU has explained that the rationale for database protection is to promote the creation 
of storage and processing systems for existing information and not the creation of materials 
capable of being collected subsequently in a database.44 ‘Substantial’ investment can consist 
of the investment of money, time, or labour. It is evident that substantial investment is 
necessary for developing smart systems, but such systems capture and collect data 
autonomously. If the development of the mechanism used to acquire an extensive collection 
of data required a large investment, it is possible that, for instance, obtaining the contents of 
the resulting database could be said to require substantive investment. If, however, there is no 
separate investment in the collection, verification, or presentation of the data, sui generis 
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database protection does not apply. Scholars have pointed out that this requirement excludes 
many important spin-off databases, such as sport fixtures, television listings, and timetables, 
from sui generis protection.45 For instance, investment in the creation of smart products with 
sensors that collect data is unlikely to be considered in the assessment of whether investment 
in a database counts as ‘substantial’. 
Finally, an additional problem with the application of database protection to datasets 
is similar to a point discussed earlier in the context of copyright: if a database is created by 
smart systems, it might prove difficult to identify its right holder(s).46 Although the maker of 
a database is not defined in the DB Directive, Recital 41 of the Directive states that ‘the 
maker of a database is the person who takes the initiative and the risk of investing’.47 
Naturally, there might be joint ownership of a database if it is created jointly by several 
actors. It is possible that, for instance, the person who collects the material for a database, the 
person who manages the technical implementation of the database, and the person who 
finances the database, could all be considered its creators. While traditional databases could 
have many contributors, for instance in the case of multimedia works,48 the situation is far 
more complicated where the creator of a database formed by a machine, like an AI system, is 
concerned. A database’s creator is the one who takes the initiative in obtaining, verifying, or 
presenting its contents and assumes the risk of those activities. Ultimately, the assessment of 
who has made the decision to develop a smart system that produces a database and who is 
financially responsible for this development, as well as for the maintenance of the smart 
system, will need to be made on a case by case basis.  
 
[C] Protecting Data Through Trade Secrets and Contracts 
 
Due to the limitations of the current IPR system when it comes to the protection of data, trade 
secrets, contractual mechanisms, and technical protection measures are often used to protect 
and trade data. In fact, these mechanisms can allow data that is not fully recognised by 
current regulations to be made excludable. It is possible to enter into a contractual agreement 
that states by whom data is owned and how the parties to the contract are entitled to use it.49 
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Directive, which confer rights on the lawful users of databases. However, the CJEU has stated in Case C-30/14 
Ryanair Ltd v. PR Aviation BV ECLI:EU:C:2015:10 that the DB Directive does not apply to databases that do 
not meet the criteria for databases as defined by the Directive. Therefore, Articles 6(1), 8, and 15 do not 
preclude the author of such a database from laying down contractual limitations on its use by third parties, 
without prejudice to the applicable national law. 
These measures may fail, however, especially in the context of data. The EU Trade 
Secrets Directive50 strengthens protection against the unlawful acquisition, use, and 
disclosure of trade secrets (including data). However, this protection applies only to 
information not ‘generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles 
that normally deal with the kind of information in question’.51 In other words, if data is 
shared with third parties or made publicly available (e.g. on a website), protection under the 
TS Directive does not apply. The TS Directive’s lack of applicability to the modern data 
industry has led prominent scholars to argue that it is already technologically outdated.52 
The use of contracts to protect data also has several issues, such as increased 
transaction costs and the unharmonised nature of European contract law, which leads to 
unpredictability and, in turn, creates impediments to the free flow of data. One important 
impediment arises from the fact that in many jurisdictions, third parties are not bound by 
contracts and therefore, contract clauses that relate to third parties are not enforceable. 
Different countries vary widely in their approaches to the principle of privity of contract and 
to how the actions of non-contractual third parties are perceived in relation to a contract.53 
 
§9.04 A New Legal Paradigm to Protect Data? 
 
In view of the rapidly growing importance of data to the digital economy, there is a need to 
address the issues surrounding the efficient protection of data in EU law. Currently, the 
poorly defined legal framework for data ownership, combined with limitations on the access 
to and trade of data, might inhibit the realisation of the full economic benefits of non-rival 
data, and could hinder innovation and effect the efficiency of data markets overall.54 One 
could argue that creating incentives for data generation and the disclosure of data and 
promoting efficient markets for data-related products requires the creation of exclusive rights. 
Clear rules on who benefits from the utilization of data could promote the free flow of data.55 
The key question, however, is: what kind of regulation is needed in order to make the data 
economy work? Is the regulation of data ownership necessary? If so, what form should this 
regulation take? 
 
[A] The Rise of Data Ownership Regimes at a National Level 
 
Issues related to the IP ownership of data have been partially addressed in the case law of 
some national courts within the EU.  
In a decision of 1995, for instance, the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe in 
Germany found that the deletion of data stored on a data carrier could infringe upon the right 
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of ownership in the data carrier itself. In other words, the protection of the ownership right in 
the data carrier was found to extend to the data stored on that carrier.56 Issues related to data 
ownership in Germany have also been discussed in subsequent cases in the context of the 
employee-employer relationship. In a decision of 2013, the court of Nürnberg57 had to decide 
whether former employees were allowed to delete data stored on their company-owned 
laptops. On the basis of the ‘Skripturakt’ doctrine (according to which the person who 
generates data gains ownership of that data, even if the data is used by the person’s employer 
or business),58 the court decided that employees were allowed to delete the data, i.e. the 
employees were conceived as having ownership rights in the data. 
Another interesting development related to data ownership from a European national 
court came in a judgement from the French Supreme Court in 2015.59 The Cour de Cassation 
found that downloading computer data without its owner’s permission amounts to the offence 
of theft. In other words, the Court seems to acknowledge that data may actually be owned.60  
 Similar questions of data ownership have been addressed differently by the UK 
courts, which have thus far held that data is not property and, as such, cannot be stolen,61 and 
that there is therefore no proprietary right in, for instance, the data included in an email.62 
These actions at a national level, together with the aforementioned legal uncertainty 
over data ownership in the EU, have increased the Commission’s concern over the barriers to 
the free flow of data in the EU, and the consequent need to tackle this issue.63 
 
[B] New Ad Hoc Exclusive Rights 
 
In the working paper on the free flow of data within the Digital Single Market, two 
alternative ways of protecting a ‘data producer’s right for non-personal or anonymised data’ 
are discussed. The first option consists of creating a new transferable intellectual property 
right, probably as a related right, in ‘non-personal or anonymised machine-generated data’. It 
would encompass ‘the exclusive right to utilise certain data, including the right to license its 
usage’. This would include a set of rights enforceable against any party, independent of 
contractual relations, preventing further illegitimate use of data by third parties. The 
exclusive right would also include the right to claim damages for unauthorised access to and 
use of data. The second option (which is not discussed further in this paper) is ‘a set of purely 
defensive rights’, following the design of the protection of know-how in the TS Directive. 
This approach would be based on ‘de facto possession’ rather than ownership: a ‘de facto 
data holder’ could be entitled to the following civil law remedies for the ‘illicit 
misappropriation of data’ by third parties: 1) the right to seek injunctions preventing further 
use of the data by third parties who have no right to use it, 2) the right to have products built 
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on the basis of misappropriated data excluded from market commercialisation, and 3) the 
possibility of claiming damages for the unauthorized use of data.64  
According to the Commission, the investments made and the resources put into the 
creation of the data would play a crucial role for acquiring a data producer’s right. In this 
regard, the Commission has identified the manufacturer of sensor-equipped machines, tools 
or devices (generating the data) who have invested in the development and market 
commercialisation of such machine, tool or device and the economic operators using them 
have to pay a price (for purchase or lease) and, thus, have to amortise the costs as they are the 
main responsible for making the investments. Although, according to the Commission, joint 
rights in data might be possible, one problem it has already acknowledged is that data is often 
created by multiple parties and, as such, a new right based on ‘ownership’ would be difficult 
to implement.65 At the time of writing. the data producer’s right is still just a proposal; if 
implemented, this new right would increase the level of protection of industrial data in the 
EU to a much higher level than that currently offered by the database right. As previously 
explained, the database right protects data only on the condition that 1) the data is structured 
in a ‘database’ (the characteristics of which are specifically defined) and 2) the database is 
the result of ‘substantial investment’. In contrast, the data producer’s right would directly 
protect machine-generated data without any prerequisites. 
Along the same lines as the Commission’s approach to this issue, some scholars have 
suggested the creation of new ad hoc rights for the protection of data. Zech, for instance, has 
suggested the creation of a non-exclusive data producer’s right with ‘machine-readable coded 
information that is defined only by its representative characters (bits)’ as its subject matter.66 
To be covered by the right, data would have to be created using automated measurement 
processes, intellectual activity, or simple computing power. The party economically 
responsible for the operation of the equipment generating the data would be given the status 
of right holder. Use of the data for statistical analyses would constitute an infringement of the 
data producer’s right, but the independent creation of the same data would not. Only 
commercial acts would be counted as infringements, as Zech suggests an exception for use of 
the data for private and non-commercial purposes. Moreover, he suggests that the protection 
offered should be both short-term and transferable.67  
 
[C] Fragmentation and Complexity do not Foster the Free Flow of Data  
 
In EU copyright law, there is a general tendency to create new related rights whenever new 
interests in protecting certain investments emerge. Often, the creation of new rights stems 
from the spectre that valuable European assets are being misappropriated by large American 
companies. For instance, the idea of Google ‘stealing’ European news has already led to an 
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introduction of  a new neighbouring press publishers’ right.68 In a similar way, it was the fear 
that the European database industry would be unable to compete against its American 
counterpart that led to the creation of the sui generis database right.  
The excessive introduction of new ad hoc neighbouring rights, however, might 
needlessly fragment and complicate the EU copyright system overall, creating insecurities in 
internal markets.69 Furthermore, the newly-proposed data producer’s right in particular has 
been criticized for reinforcing the bargaining position of data holders and for needlessly 
increasing transaction costs. There may not be any need to create additional incentives for the 
manufacturers of devices that produce data, since IPR already protects such hardware and 
software. The data aggregators and analysts who create new value in data markets, on the 
other hand, might actually need such incentives.70 Furthermore, the potential impact of the 
data producer’s right is unclear and ambiguous: it has the potential to both enhance and 
inhibit valuable activities in the data economy. As Kim points out, before examining data 
aggregators and analysts as potential candidates to be considered data right holders, the need 
to create additional incentives to facilitate the exchange and analysis of data should itself be 
scrutinized.71  
Another problem with the Commission’s proposed solution relates to the issue of data 
ownership. Interestingly enough, the Commission’s initiative to introduce a new exclusive 
right in data has attracted considerable criticism not only from academia, but also from the 
industry.72 There are two main reasons why the industry in particular is opposed to the 
introduction of new exclusive rights for data: firstly, many data-producing firms are also 
reliant on access to the data of other firms. Secondly, the criteria for who would qualify as 
the data owner under the new right are not at all clear. Although the Commission has 
expressed concern that a new right based on ownership might fail due to the fact that data is 
usually produced by multiple parties, a data producer’s right based on the Commission’s idea 
of having both manufacturers and users be classified as right holders might actually 
exacerbate this problem further. As Kim argues, it might not be possible to ‘hit both birds 
with one stone’. On the one hand, she points out, one justification for granting exclusive 
rights in data to data users is the fact that users might not have access to the data gathered by 
the manufacturers of smart systems. On the other, however, a data producer’s right might not 
be a suitable solution here, especially given the fact that multiple right holders could prove to 
be an impediment to opportunities to license data.73 
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More fundamentally, among the multiple negative aspects of this new right, a key 
drawback is that it would destroy the core principle in IP law that data per se is not 
protectable and that only creative, innovative, or other meritorious investments can receive 
protection.74 The introduction of sui generis database protection has already weakened this 
fundamental idea. Making the same mistake again should be avoided: protecting investments 
that are not clearly connected to creativity is a path that should not be followed. It should also 
be noted that business and technology reports have highlighted that recognising ownership 
rights in single pieces of data (and small datasets) could lead to a scarcity of data, hindering 
innovation through big data analytics.75  
Another point of concern over the data producer’s right is that it would overlap with 
other IPR regimes, such as copyright and database rights, endangering the user freedoms 
guaranteed under these frameworks. Finally, it is also difficult to understand how this new 
right would work with the new text and data mining exception that is at the heart of the DSM 
Directive. 
 
§9.05 Fostering the Free Flow of Data 
 
[A] The Renaissance of the Sui Generis Database Right 
 
A more workable alternative solution for regulating and protecting data could be sought by 
revising the existing sui generis database right regime. This solution could promote greater 
coherence within the copyright system instead of complicating it further and causing more 
insecurity in markets, as would the adoption of new ad hoc rights. Additionally, revising 
existing rights would make it easier to coordinate and harmonise existing provisions affecting 
the use of data. 
This option would involve extending the scope of the protection provided by the sui 
generis right to cover datasets that currently fall outside it. This would mean, at the very 
least, that the definition of ‘database’ and the requirement of ‘substantial investment’ would 
need to be revisited. In practical terms, this would require either modifications to the text of 
the Directive and/or judiciary developments through case law interpretation. We argue that if 
these changes are to be made, developing a new line of interpretation via case law would be 
more flexible and suitable than changing the text of the DB Directive itself. As such, should 
this course of action be followed, revisions to the text of the Directive (e.g. a revision to the 
term of protection for datasets) should be kept to a minimum, while the scope of the 
protection it offers (as well as the requirements needed to qualify for protection) should be 
developed via case law interpretation.  
The general definition of a database in the DB Directive as a ‘collection of 
independent works, data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and 
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individually accessible by electronic or other means’ could, for instance, be interpreted in 
such a way as to include some datasets. The core issue here would be the revision of CJEU 
interpretations of what constitutes a database to fit the purpose of providing protection for 
datasets. Both the fixed base requirement and the requirement for technical means to allow 
for the retrieval of data from this fixed base would need to be uncoupled from the definition 
of a database in order to provide protection for datasets. One way to achieve this would be the 
creation of separate categories of database, for instance ‘traditional databases’ (i.e. databases 
defined in accordance with the current interpretation of the DB Directive) and ‘dataset 
databases’ (i.e. a new type of protected subject matter to cover datasets, the scope of 
protection for which would need to be redefined via case law interpretation). In a way, this 
line of thinking could be compared to a similar approach in the field of copyright, where the 
definition of ‘work’ is used in an equally flexible manner, although different categories of 
work exist (and traditionally, different originality thresholds have been applied to these 
different categories)76. Similarly, different categories of database (including, but not 
necessarily limited to, traditional databases and dataset databases) could fall under the 
umbrella definition of a database, even though the concept of a database (like the concept of 
work in the copyright framework) would apply equally to all categories.  
Different ‘thresholds of investment’ to attract protection would then need to be 
developed and applied. As such, the requirement for ‘substantial investment’ would need 
some reconsideration. The difficulty is that the DB Directive 7.1 Article requires substantial 
investment in the ‘obtaining, verification or presentation’ of the content of a database in order 
for it to receive protection. Thus, substantial investment in, for instance, the development of a 
smart system that collects data into a database is not counted for this purpose. Accepting 
these kinds of investment when deciding on whether to grant protection to a database could 
lead to too many IPRs being awarded to recoup the same/similar investments: in smart 
systems, the capture and collection of data is automated and, as such, these systems do not 
necessarily require further investment beyond that funnelled into the development of the 
smart machine itself. Moreover, though it is reasonable to grant IPRs to incentivize 
innovation in smart systems, it is questionable whether the developer of a smart machine 
should also be entitled to IP ownership rights in the output generated automatically by that 
machine: considering investment in developing a smart system as a valid reason to grant 
protection to a database could lead to exactly this outcome.77 Therefore, a further, more 
specific requirement should be developed by the CJEU for determining whether datasets 
qualify for protection. One option could be to revisit interpretations and consider also 
investments devolved to the creation of smart systems by 1) raising the “threshold of 
investment” and 2) requiring certain “types of outcome”. For instance, some kind of “super or 
extraordinary investment” in the developing of the machine that have subsequently resulted 
in the creation of “valuable” datasets DB could be required.  This would likely mean that 
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only a small group of datasets would be protected. Although this proposal could create new 
opportunities in terms of the protection of data, the subjectivity of its criteria might lead to 
further difficulties. 
Another downside of the current provision is the duration of the sui generis right: 
fifteen years is clearly longer than is reasonably needed for the protection of datasets. A new 
maximum duration for the protection of datasets, for instance, five years, could be set instead. 
This change could not be achieved without revisiting the text of the DB Directive, however.  
 The extension of the reach of exclusive rights discussed above might lead to the need 
to introduce further mandatory exceptions and limitations (E&Ls) in addition to those 
currently contemplated in the Directive. This might be necessary to create a proper balance 
between providing protection for data, and access to it. E&Ls might be necessary, for 
instance, to guarantee that the interests of all the stakeholders involved in the collection of a 
set of data, for example public authorities, are respected. An extensive and flexible set of 
E&Ls might very well prove a necessity. A fair use limitation or exception would be the most 
suitable type, despite the challenges to introducing such a provision in civil law countries.78  
 Overall, even though there might be room to adjust the scope of the DB Directive 
(and revisiting the sui generis database right is certainly a better solution than creating new 
ad hoc rights, causing further fragmentation), the potential harm this could cause to the free 
flow of data might actually exceed the benefits of creating legal certainty on the ownership of 
data. A better solution would be to promote the free flow of data by fostering a model at the 
EU level that would impede the national barriers to the free flow of data created by, for 
instance, ownership-like legislation on data in the Member States.  
 
[B] The Fifth Internal Market Freedom: The Free Flow of Data 
 
Unquestionably, the best solution for fostering the free flow of data is non-regulation. Any 
further steps towards creating exclusive rights in data or information per se, that is to say 
protecting investments that do not have a clear link to creativity and inventiveness, should, in 
fact, be discouraged. Extending protection to data per se would not only conflict with the 
basic principles of IP law, but would also lead to an imbalance in favour of right holders, to 
the detriment of access. On the subject of incentives, it should also be noted that in the digital 
age, most datasets are generated by machines, not by creative humans. Even though there 
might be human involvement in the creation of data, human effort is usually directed towards 
the methods by which data is measured and the design of the machines and software that 
collect it. The design of machines and software falls within the scope of IPR protection; thus, 
in an indirect way, the system already provides incentives to create data. Moreover, as data is 
a representation of observed and measured facts, rather than a creation of the human mind, it 
is questionable whether the use of IPRs to incentivize developments in data production is 
even appropriate. 
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At the same time, there is a need to strengthen the principle of the free flow of data at 
the EU level by ensuring that no unjustified barriers to the free movement of data across the 
union arise at a national level. As previously discussed, recent developments at a national 
level seem to indicate that countries are leaning toward expanding the scope of exclusive 
rights to data. Indeed, an increase in this type of legislation is one of the reasons that the 
Commission has initiated legislative proposals on data regulation at the EU level. As 
discussed in this article, however, none of the solutions proposed by the Commission thus far 
seem suitable for balancing the protection of data against providing access to data. Existing 
IPRs might provide some protection to data already. Whether there is a need to increase the 
level of protection by introducing new ownership rights or extending the scope of existing 
rights is highly doubtful. Finding solutions to such an important issue requires us to take a 
step backwards and consider more fundamental and broad-minded approaches. As such, 
instead of looking at this issue from the narrow perspective of IPR or exclusive rights to data, 
there might be a need to create a new fundamental principle, that of the free flow of data, 
alongside the existing four Internal Market freedoms.79 In this context, the idea of 
establishing the free flow of data as a fifth freedom in EU Treaties is worth considering. This 
discussion, however, is an entirely different subject, which goes beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
 
§9.06 Conclusions 
 
With the rise of the data economy, issues related to the regulation of non-personal data 
though ownership-like frameworks are becoming increasingly pressing and relevant. Data 
regulation via exclusive rights, however, should be approached carefully, in order to avoid 
the risk of adopting solutions that impede the free flow of data rather than fostering it.  
Currently, the European Union’s framework for data ownership is short-sighted in 
multiple ways. The consequence of this is that, on the one hand, no proper regulation for data 
exists ( potentially harming innovation) while, on the other, solutions to tackle the issue of 
data ownership are starting to arise at a national level (potentially creating barriers to the free 
flow of data across the EU). Creating new ad hoc laws or exclusive rights for data, as the EU 
Commission currently proposes doing, would increase fragmentation and uncertainty in the 
field. A solution could be sought in revisiting the sui generis database right in the EU and 
broadening its scope. This would require revisions to database protection from multiple 
angles (including the scope of protection and term of protection). Ultimately, however, the 
potential harm this solution could cause to the free flow of data might actually exceed the 
benefits of creating this type of ownership right. Instead of adopting quick, short-term 
solutions, it would be advisable for the EU legislator and policymakers to keep calm in the 
face of the pressures posed by the data economy. In this spirit, the free flow of data could be 
fostered by preventing the construction of, inter alia, national barriers in the form of 
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ownership-like legislation on data in the Member States. Serious consideration should be 
given to establishing a fifth fundamental freedom in the EU, the free flow of data, as a way of 
reaching this long-term goal. 
